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ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew John Ford:  Towards a Political Economy of Incentives in Managing for 
Development Results. 
(Under the Direction of Thomas Oatley) 
 
What are the incentives and disincentives for poor-country governments to improve 
information systems to Manage for Development Results (MfDR)? This paper argues that the 
main incentive is the recognition of long-term benefits of MfDR approaches and tools for 
social welfare. MfDR can increase the inclusiveness of government interests, improve 
decision making for policy and implementation, and help address information asymmetry 
problems. Disincentives arise especially out of weak governance capacity and narrow 
interests. Narrow interests may seek to maintain the status quo creating low demand and 
possibly opposition. A poor country is more likely to move towards results-based 
management approaches if political leaders are convinced to take a long-run perspective, and 
bureaucrats given appropriate incentives to address short-term costs and provide security. 
This paper considers a range of material and non-material incentives that may either support 
or hinder implementation of MfDR, as influenced by local and international actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background  
 
Despite hundreds of billions1 of dollars in aid 2 having been channelled to Africa over the 
last fifty years, extreme poverty persists. While the causes of this poverty are basically 
known, the relative attribution of factors is contested, and the way to remedy them difficult. 
The causes include historical, geographical, economic-structural and conflict-related factors, 
health issues, and many others.3 Poverty is also both a cause and effect of poor governance. 
Aid to Africa is significant in that it accounts for a significant proportion of government 
revenues, with the average, excluding South Africa and Nigeria, receiving the equivalent of 
12.3 percent of its GDP in overseas development assistance (ODA) in 1996.4 Yet, it is only 
recently that serious efforts have been made to determine the actual outcomes and impacts of 
aid spending. This is evidenced by the comparatively small amounts of money on spent on 
 
1 Pomerantz (2004), Easterly (2006), p4. 
2 Defined as: a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another 
independent organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at 
least a 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the 
country receiving the aid. (Lancaster (2007) p.9). This definition is very close to that of the 
OECD’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) definition. 
3 Commission for Africa (2005). 
4 van de Walle (2001), p8. 
2Monitoring and Evaluation of program outcomes compared to the amounts given to loans 
and grants.  
 Aid is a relatively new phenomenon, having begun with the end of Second World War, 
and was intended for four main purposes: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, 
and commercial, with cultural purposes present but less prominent.5 While in the past aid was 
guided by relatively strong political and economic interests, with the end of the cold war, 
space has been opened up for that other main aim of international aid: to better the human 
condition.6 International institutions, governments, and social scientists have come to see ‘the 
persistence of mass poverty not only as a major ethical and political problem but also as a 
serious threat to macroeconomic stability’7 and some as ‘a brake on long term [global] 
growth’.8 In response to the persistent evidence of poverty, and international civil society 
voicing concern and pressure, a number of international and bilateral initiatives have been 
launched, the most prominent among them being the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).9 The MDGs set out an ambitious program aimed at tackling the 
world’s most pressing basic needs. In response, other multilateral and bilateral agencies have 
rallied around the goals in an attempt to align their programs. However, while progress has 
been made, most of the MDGs look beyond reach, especially in Sub Saharan Africa, with 
results being disappointing despite the resources and efforts.  
 
5 Lancaster (2007). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Cornia (2005).  
8 Ibid. 
9 See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
3Given conditions where the sources of economic opportunities are few, and capacities are 
low, aid features as a dominant potential source of economic rents. This places a particular 
burden on recipient governments to develop systems and individual capacities sufficiently 
competent and motivated to manage large resource flows and program tasks for the general 
welfare of citizens, amidst potentially strong internal and external pressures to favour narrow 
interests, including to engage or be complicit in corrupt activities. Availability and 
transparency of information is very important in this effort to have resources used for 
activities that are productive for poor people, providing the basis for improved decision 
making, and accountability of government actions. 
 
What the paper is about 
This paper outlines a framework for understanding the role of information in government 
effectiveness. It outlines theoretically how certain kinds of information can significantly 
impact quality of decisions for public welfare and increase accountability for actions, thereby 
leading to the potential for improved development outcomes over time. It frames the 
attainment of results as an institutional problem within which information is important. In 
considering the effects of improved information systems, it also specifically explores the 
incentives and disincentives that governments may face to develop MfDR systems in the first 
place, since reform processes are difficult precisely because they will impact the status quo, 
thereby threatening established interests. The overall aim is to contribute to the growing 
political economy literature that considers the role of information to be important and places 
incentives at the centre of practical efforts to improve development outcomes.  
 
4Approach and structure of the paper 
Two complementary models are used to consider the incentives for governments to 
implement information systems to Managing for Development Results (MfDR). The ideas 
developed in these models are then applied to consider how the incentives of politicians and 
bureaucrats may be influenced over time by the presence of improved information, and what 
influence external actors may have both on incentives to have governments implement such 
systems and in their use over time. 
 First we will consider what is MfDR, the context from which it came, and what it seeks to 
achieve. Second, In Part I, government elite motivations to provide for the general welfare 
are formally modelled using the interests-based model of McGuire & Olson (1996). From 
McGuire & Olson we learn that it is in the interests of government elites to provide public 
goods that add to public welfare to the extent that they hold what McGuire and Olson term an 
‘encompassing interest’ in society, such that the elite interests also benefit, through their take 
in taxes. In this model the key to societal improvement is in providing incentives,10 and in 
choosing or encouraging government elites that are more inclusive of a greater section of 
interests within society. This interest-based view is placed within a more generalized and 
nuanced picture in which the actions of politicians and other stakeholders are seen to be 
 
10 An ‘incentive’ is defined as a stimuli for action. A positive incentive is as a stimuli that 
encourages a person to do something, while a negative incentive (a disincentive) is an 
incentive to not do something/avoid something. A lack of incentive would result in inaction, 
inertia. Incentives are distinguished from ‘motivations’, that being defined as an individual 
person’s response to a given incentive. A given incentive (stimuli) may have a different 
effect upon a person depending upon their values, frame of mind, social position, degree of 
hunger, greed etcetera. That is, an incentive may motivate a person to act, but they need a 
motive/will to want to do so (agency), which also relies on normative values- what a person 
actively believes to be right and wrong.  
5impacted by a range of incentives (not just ‘self-interest’ narrowly defined). The role of 
information is shown to be central in influencing those incentives.  
 The effect of asymmetric information problems on the motivations of politicians and 
bureaucrats are then modelled using the agency framework of Besley (2006). According to 
the agency view, at the centre of effective government lies the solution to the principle-agent 
problem between citizens and government.11 Whereas the presence of perfect information 
creates both knowledge and mutual accountability between actors interacting through formal 
and informal institutions, and creates incentives towards accountable behaviour, problems 
arise under imperfect conditions. The main problems include selecting competent and 
appropriately motivated politicians and bureaucrats (‘hidden knowledge’), and ensuring that 
they are accountable for doing what they’re supposed to be doing (‘hidden action’).  
 These models help us to show how information can be a powerful source of incentives for 
politicians and bureaucrats to choose and implement better policies, and that the key to these 
incentives is in creating conditions where information is available to those with the power to 
use that information effectively within formal and informal accountability structures. 
Politicians must, however, first be convinced to implement those systems. Part II B therefore 
considers the broader influences that internal and external actors can have in encouraging 
governments to implement improved information (MfDR) systems and use them. Overall, 
this paper seeks to contribute by showing with interest-based and principal-agent theory how 
improved information systems can help overcome barriers to government effectiveness over 
time. 
11 Besley (2006), p96. 
6What is Managing for Development Results? 
In its broader meaning Managing for Development Results refers to the implementation of 
reforms to the way that donors and recipients approach the issue of Aid Effectiveness, and is 
a follow-up to the Monterrey Conference for Financing Development in 2002 and the Paris 
Declaration of 2005.12 These focused on strengthening the quality of the partnership between 
donor and recipient countries, including in areas of: (i) country leadership and ownership of 
development policies; (ii) alignment of donors with partners’ strategies; (iii) donors’ 
harmonisation of procedures and practices to reduce the burden on recipients; (iv) improving 
country’s capacities and systems for managing for results; and (v) increasing mutual 
accountability.13 Managing for Results comprises one specific part of the Paris Declaration, 
and also refers more narrowly to a specific set of approaches and tools, originally developed 
for private sector business, but progressively brought into development work.14 This more 
specific MfDR is a set of constructive tools with which MfDR aims to link strategic goals, 
monitoring of progress towards those goals, and assessment of outcomes. By integrating the 
different stages of project/policy planning, implementation, and assessment, the approach 
aims to improve the quality of transparency, accountability and performance of individuals 
and systems within the public service provision process, and thereby development outcomes.  
 These are essentially a set of results-based management (RBM) approaches and tools15 
applied to development, though RBM tools can be applied to achieve any kind of results. 
 
12 See Paris Declaration: Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf
13 ‘About Managing for Development Results’ at: http://www.mfdr.org
14 See: Cooley (2007). 
15 See, for an example: Baldrige National Quality Program (2007). 
7These approaches particularly focus on the collection and use of quality information (data) to 
base decisions. MfDR also refers to a more participatory and inclusive approach than 
ordinary RBM, focusing recipient country governments and donors on ‘results’ for 
beneficiaries, in particular to alleviate poverty. 16  These tools include improving results 
frameworks, 17  information systems including Monitoring & Evaluation, statistics, and 
performance budgeting. 18  Monitoring and Evaluation tools and approaches include both 
quantitative and qualitative tools. These tools can range from the use of very simple 
questionnaires about the perceived service received by beneficiaries, through to complex 
scientific measurements. A distinctive feature of MfDR is not only the creation of quality 
data for use in policy-making and implementation decision-making, but an emphasis on the 
efficacy of its wide disbursement to relevant stakeholders. This second function, that of 
information flow, increases the possibility of accountability of actors for results, depending 
on 'who has access to what information. As in the relatively successful MfDR cases of China, 
Vietnam, and Rwanda, 19  ‘development results’ has not necessarily meant increased 
transparency to citizens in the short-term, even if needed information has gone to government 
 
16 See www.mfdr.org for detailed overview and resources. 
17 A results framework links inputs, processes, and outputs to outcomes for a given planned 
intervention. See, for a detailed explanation: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTANNREPOPEEVA/0,,cont
entMDK:21115876~menuPK:3136548~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3073
310,00.html
18  Performance budgeting aims to link program outcomes with budget allocations by 
requiring ministers to justify changes in expenditure on the basis of evidence of need or 
performance. 
19 See: Managing for Development Results Principles in Action: Sourcebook on Emerging 
Good (March 2007).  Available at: http://www.mfdr.org/sourcebook/MfDRSourcebook-Feb-
16-2006.pdf, case studies. 
8officials well enough to make effective decisions. This suggests that whatever the tools and 
approaches encouraged by the push to encourage and support MfDR, recipient country 
governments will still use what they find appropriate to their own agendas. 
 It is being increasingly recognized that incentives play a key role in the success of 
implementation and institutionalisation of results-based approaches,20 as well as the roles of 
leadership including idea ‘championing’.21 However, while much work has now been done 
on identifying feature of good practices,22 the specific literature that examines the incentives 
to implement those practices is not yet well developed, and is evolving. The present paper 
hopes to further that evolution. In this section we have considered what is MfDR and how it 
relates to the broader agenda of Aid Effectiveness as well as more general results-based 
management approaches. It thereby sets a foundation for considering the role of information 
and MfDR in government. We now move to consider how the availability and use of quality 
information impacts the quality of governance.  
 
Description of the Problem and Why it is Important  
A core problem of development is that poor countries often have poor governance. Poor 
governance is exacerbated by three main things: diverging interests, lack of capacity (in 
systems and individuals), and information problems (ignorance and lack of accountability). 
Though difficult and time-consuming to develop, lack of capacity can be addressed through 
investment in systems and sustained education and training of individuals, as well as 
 
20 Concluding Memorandum, 3rd International Roundtable on Managing for Development 
Results, Hanoi, Vietnam, February 8th, 2007. Available at: www.mfdr.org , and Mackay 
(2006).  
21 Mackay (2006). 
22 See op cit. MfDR Principles in Action (2007).  
9appropriate incentives to retain them. Problems of diverging interests and information are 
perhaps less easily addressed. This paper focuses on describing the importance of 
information for improved decision-making in government, and shows the crucial role 
information can play in creating incentives to influence divergent interests within society 
towards more inclusive government. This section of the paper outlines the problem and why 
it is important, in order to provide a guide for what follows.  
 The problem of information is important for two main types of reason. First, poor 
information makes decision-making difficult because of ignorance, potentially leading to 
mistakes and sub-optimal policies.23 Ignorance caused by a lack of quality information also 
contributes to other government failures. Second, poor availability (transparency) of 
information to citizens and other authorities makes it difficult for them to hold political and 
bureaucratic actors accountable and removes possible disincentives to poor performance and 
possible corrupt activities. This lack of accountability exacerbates the problem of divergent 
interests, can lead to individuals taking advantage of poor information to further their own 
private ends.  
 
In an ideal world, government provides public goods including stability and security, 
regulates externalities of private actions, provides a facilitative environment for a market 
system- including establishing property rights and a functioning judiciary- regulates abuses 
and failures of market power, and distributes resources towards socially needy groups. Good 
government has tended to be associated with good policies, which tend to be defined in terms 
 
23 Such as over taxation and under-provision of public goods. 
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of both efficiency and distribution24 measured in relation to social welfare. Good policies in 
turn refer to policies that are feasible according to constraints such as budget, technology, 
institutional capacity, incentive constraints, informational constraints, and so on. As a rule, 
the benchmark for good policy is ‘second-best Pareto efficiency’, which means taking into 
account restrictions on policy instruments when formulating strategies. This approach 
formalises the notion that there is an inevitable trade-off between efficiency and other values 
such as equity,25 and also that, given constraints, a theoretically optimal policy may not in 
practice be best once taking feasibility constraints into consideration.26 Considerations of 
optimal policies to further social welfare are information-dependent. Without quality 
information, it is difficult to know what policies may be most effective and target them 
appropriately. 27 
24 Besley (2006), p23. 
25 This is often referred to as the Pigouvian model (noted in Besley (2006), p24. 
26 MfDR is significant for the notion of social welfare and good policies both because of its 
focus on improving information to improve results as well as the potential to inform policy-
makers knowledge about what is needed, and therefore form a better approximation of what a 
social welfare function might look like, and also what may be feasible. 
27 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have devised six indicators of governance that are now being 
used widely as proxies for governance quality: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability/No Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. These indicators are difficult to measure, have very large error 
margins, and are all highly correlated, making them of limited usefulness. Gradually, as the 
value of such indicators is recognised, more accurate ways to assess these kinds of indicators 
are however being developed.World Bank is now measuring and using these indicators as 
part of their governance ratings systems that forms a part of the allocations of funding to 
country governments. See:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:209
33600~menuPK:2626968~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html
11
Low quality governments typically are characterized by poor policies and practices. These 
are of two kinds:28 First, at a broad level, low quality governments may adopt ‘ignorant’ 
policies because of a lack of competence of policy makers, because of malfeasance, or from a 
lack of accurate information. These policies could include overly burdensome regulations, 
excessive taxation, unfair allocation of benefits, poor planning, as well as those that create 
conditions such as high inflation, high black market premiums, negative real interest rates, 
high budget deficits, restrictions on free trade, and poor public services.29 Second, a lack of 
information about government actors’ actions makes them unaccountable to the citizens they 
are entrusted to serve, leading to incentives to take advantage of this lack of transparency 
through rent extraction or distributing benefits to narrow or special interests.30 
The worst of this second problem is the case of corruption. Corruption occurs in two basic 
forms: centralized ‘grand corruption’ (higher level officials) and decentralized ‘petty 
corruption’ that occurs within the bureaucracy. 31  We would expect that the sources of 
corruption will differ according to the opportunities available to actors, their abilities to 
extract rents, and their will to do so (based on normative values/intrinsic motivations). A core 
 
28 This literature having been founded by Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1973). 
29 Easterly (2001), p117. Sources of government failure include (i) ignorance, (ii) the use of 
influence, and (iii) quality of leadership. Some forms of ignorance can lead to policy 
mistakes being made, especially compared to the case of full information. Such decisions are 
likely to be Pareto inefficient, and also fail specific welfare criteria when compared with 
those made with perfect or improved knowledge. These policies may also not Pareto 
dominate the status quo; that is, there implementation may even reduce overall welfare. The 
use of private influence can be problematic when powerful organized groups change the 
policy preferences of leadership in a way that does not promote overall social welfare. 
30 This problem is described formally below in Part I B in describing the principal-agent 
problem. 
31 Lambsdorff (2006).  
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causal feature of corruption is described well by Samuel Huntington’s observation that: 
“where political opportunities are scarce, corruption occurs as people use wealth to buy 
power, and where economic opportunities are few, corruption occurs when political power is 
used to pursue wealth.”32 Factors that may encourage corruption include low transparency 
and accountability, elite rule, neo-patrimonial networks, and weak competition for resources 
between elite actors. Certain government policies, because of the opportunities they create, 
have been found to be particularly correlated with corruption, while other policies are 
correlated with lower corruption. In the absence of good monitoring (information) and 
enforcement of anti-corruption, one way to decrease corruption is thought to be the adoption 
of policies that allow less discretion to agents, thereby decreasing opportunities. 
 Development requires governance that falls closer to the ideal than to the perverse. MfDR 
is about improving the quality of information in support of this goal. The problem, however, 
is that societies characterized by ‘bad governance’ are also those in which corruption is high. 
If corruption is high within government policy-maker ranks (grand corruption) and/or 
bureaucrats (petty corruption), those officials fostering narrow interests by being involved in 
the corrupt activities will have little incentive to implement information-revealing systems 
that will expose them and reduce their benefits by their’ adopting MfDR practices. It is 
important to find ways to encourage leaders to improve information collection and utilization 
and institutionalise this use in a way that gradually reinforces improved policy-making, 
implementation, and accountability structures. What are the incentives and disincentives to 
doing this? Having considered the problem in more detail, the following section considers the 
dynamics of government decision-making in more formal terms.  
 
32 Cited in Andvig et al. (2000). 
PART I.  Political Institutions, Information, and the Quality of Governance 
 
Encouraging governments to adopt MfDR is a step in the direction of higher quality 
governance can be thought of as finding solutions to two problems: an information problem 
and an incentive problem. The information problem involves two aspects: collecting and 
using quality information for improved decision-making, and creating transparent governance 
structures so that those who hold policymakers accountable have the information they need 
to do so effectively.  The incentive problem involves creating a political institutional 
environment in which policymakers are rewarded for adopting and implementing good 
policies, by linking policymaker activity to mechanisms of accountability. Just as 
information on the behaviour of actors is crucial for accountability, accountability structures 
are crucial to ensure the use of information for public welfare. In the absence of good 
information systems, neither condition is likely to be met. 
 Improving information systems is also important for another reason; in the effort to link 
top-down planning with bottom-up, demand-driven initiatives. If information systems are 
good, it may be increasingly possible to respond to grass roots success with top-down 
support, rather than top-down imposition. This is neatly described by Easterly’s distinction33 
between a ‘planner’ approach (top-down & prescriptive), and a ‘seeker’ approach (bottom-up 
and scale-up based on local experience). If sufficiently well aligned, Managing for Results 
 
33 Easterly (2006).  
14
tools can be used to combine the plan making of politicians with the learning and scaling-up 
of successful local actor interventions.  
 Here I present two broad theoretical models that succinctly illustrate the underlying 
problems and highlight where and how changes must occur in order to promote higher 
quality governance. I look first at a basic model that argues that the incentive to pursue 
welfare-enhancing policies is a function of the encompassing-ness of the ruling coalition. I 
then turn to principal-agent model to discuss why transparency and information revelation is 
necessary for accountability mechanisms to function effectively. 
 
A. Political Institutions and Incentives to Enhance Social Welfare 
McGuire and Olson (1996) present a formal model of government decision-making that 
contrasts the incentives faced by dictatorial and democratic governments. In this they include 
how these forms affect tax rates, income distribution, and public goods provision. Overall it 
is shown that an optimising majority in control of a society necessarily redistributes less 
income to itself than a rational self-interested autocrat would to himself, and that there is a 
symmetry along a continuum from autocratic regimes, to redistributive majorities, to ‘super-
encompassing’ ruling interests, to consensual societies.34 Assuming taxation to be the sole 
means of gaining resources, they arrive at a surprising finding: in cases of both dictator and 
democracy, taxation will be limited, and the provision of public goods will benefit the self-
interested actor in power. If an optimising entity with coercive power has a sufficiently 
encompassing interest in the returns derived from taxing a productive population, it will 
serve that entity to provide public goods up to an optimal point. They also note that when a 
 
34 McGuire & Olson (1996), p73. 
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rational self-interested actor with coercive power has an encompassing and stable interest 
over the domain, power is exercised in a way that is consistent with the interests of society. 
 
In a anarchic environment where there is little incentive to invest or produce because it 
will be stolen, it will benefit a bandit leader to become a settled ruler with a given rate of tax 
theft, leaving his victims with an incentive to produce. By providing a peaceful order and 
other public goods, he encourages his subjects to be more productive. From limiting his rate 
of theft, he obtains more resources than from roving banditry, and the subjects are better off 
because they obtain public goods and the increase not taken in taxes. Because the bandit 
leader has an “encompassing interest”, he bears the social loss of the distortions caused by 
his taxation, which limits the rate of taxation.35 
Deadweight losses occur from taxation because the income is not used for reinvestment. 
The autocrat will decrease collections at the point where the deadweight loss from his 
taxation reduces the income of society enough that it decreases his collections. The rational 
autocrat spends some of the collected taxes on public goods so as to increase productivity 
and thereby net tax collections over time. They must choose both the tax rate and the level 
[and type] of public good expenditure, in the attempt to obtain an optimum. The larger the 
share of output the autocrat takes in taxes, the larger his encompassing interest, and the 
greater his incentive to take full account of the gains to society from the public good. A 
difficulty in the analysis is simultaneously accounting for both the deadweight losses from 
taxation and the productivity of provided public goods.  
 
35 The linear tax rate determines his share of the society’s benefits from the public good, as 
well as the society’s losses from redistributive taxation. Analysis demonstrates that were 
lump-sum taxation possible, taxes would be higher and more of the public good would be 
provided, though is not possible in reality. 
16
The same basic incentives face democratic societies. An optimising majority in control of 
a society will limit taxes taken from a minority for itself and provide public goods, on self 
interested grounds, taking less than a self-interested autocrat. In an idealized consensual 
democracy, a situation where the distribution of initial endowments hold unanimous support, 
public good expenditures do not exceed tax revenues, since the income distortions from 
excessive taxation would incur deadweight losses not warranted by a demand for income 
redistribution. Whereas the autocrat thinks only of his own benefit, the consensual society 
necessarily considers all of the benefits of the public good. The consensual democracy 
chooses a tax rate where the marginal social benefit of the tax just equals its cost as perceived 
by that society.36 
Democratic societies share three fundamental principles. First, there is competition for votes 
to determine who controls the government. Second, government can redistribute income as 
well as provide public goods. Third, behaviour depends upon the share of the economy that 
office-holders include in their decision calculus. Rather than enjoying unanimous support, 
most governments represent a ruling interest, such as a majority, or an oligarchy also 
encompassing business interests. Some people are necessarily excluded. Other things being 
equal, policies that increase the aggregate income and welfare also make the ruling interests 
better off. This provides a strong incentive for democratic governments to take account of 
citizen interests. Even better for the ruling interest is if, in addition to increased aggregate 
income, there is a redistribution of income to it from the minority or non-ruling interest. In 
 
36  Note: The marginal cost of the public good for the non-redistributional society is 
necessarily greater than the direct cost of the public good because of the deadweight loss of 
taxes.  
17
this case the ruling interest optimises their material interests though using their control over 
government to redistribute to themselves.  
 In the model the ruling interest earns income from (1) the market, and (2) redistributing 
funds, after taking out costs incurred in providing public good. McGuire & Olson note that 
the larger is the ruling interests’ income interest in the market, the lower will be its optimal 
tax rate. This agrees with the general observation that a stronger private sector will prefer less 
taxes. Similar to in the autocrat situation, the larger is the ruling interests’ encompassing 
interest, the larger also is its share of the deadweight losses associated with taxation. It also, 
therefore, wants to tax less and spend more of the taxes that it raises on the provision of 
public goods. The same point is reached as for a non-distributive democracy, and as for a 
consensual democracy. The implication of this model is that both the majority and minority 
pay for their share of the tax burden.37 
This model is significant to us for three reasons. First, it demonstrates how even purely 
self-interested government actors have strong incentives to invest in public goods so as to 
increase the productivity of society over time. Second, it demonstrates the need of 
government for good information with which to decide public policy problems, including 
how much to tax the people, and what level of public goods (and perhaps what kind of public 
goods) to provide. If governments are ignorant of the tax burden citizens are willing to bear 
relative to satisfactory public goods provision, instability and even conflict may ensue. Third, 
by implication, it demonstrates the central importance of investing in information systems 
37 McGuire and Olson (1996), p80. Two problems not comprehensively dealt with in the 
paper are the issues of when coercive power to tax is disbursed amongst different individuals 
or groups, each with a narrow interest in society. If such interests exist in democracies, these 
democracies will do far worse than described in the models here. Special interest groups have 
no interest in limiting the deadweight losses they impose on society.  
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like MfDR for even self-interested governments. The only stable equilibrium for a 
government in the long term is that it is aware of its citizens and able to address their basic 
needs at least enough to keep them appeased. Information is crucial for this. An 
encompassing interest will therefore consider investing in MfDR a public good with a long-
term return. As a public good with the long-term potential to yield improvements in societal 
outputs (and thereby future tax revenues) the model therefore implies a strong incentive for 
government elites to invest in MfDR, if they take a long-term view. If a short-term view is 
taken, perhaps because of the threat of regime change, the short-term costs of investing in 
MfDR systems may not be attractive even to self-interested actors. These incentives may be 
affected if international donors are willing to bear the costs of implementing improved 
information systems, even in unstable political environments.  
 This model has demonstrated how information is important for government-elites to 
pursue their own interests, and in so doing can also advance social welfare if elite interests 
are sufficiently encompassing. The following section examines information not as a positive 
planning and implementation tool, but as a knowledge and action revealer. Whereas the 
interest-based model discussed tells us about instrumental uses of information for positive 
policy formation, the following agency model demonstrates how information can also be 
used as both a tool to gain prior knowledge of actors’ competencies and motivations, and 
provide accountability where incentives would otherwise be weak.  
 
B. Information asymmetries and the principal-agent problem 
Whereas the interest-based model tells us a lot about the actions of the government elite in 
pursuing their broad interests, it does not tell us much about the relationships between 
different actors in the system. The different roles of different actors are important because 
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people specialize according to their function, and because these different roles impose 
different limitations on their ability to hold and act upon information. A basic problem in 
politics is where there is an asymmetric relationship in which authority is held on one side 
and an informational advantage on the other.38 Information asymmetry is to be expected and 
unproblematic so long as information is shared. However, it may become a problem when the 
interests of the two actors diverge, and one actor has an incentive to withhold information 
from the other. One approach developed to address this issue is principal-agent theory.39 
Whereas in the McGuire & Olsen model information is treated as a public good that is treated 
as endogenous, the principal-agent approach demonstrates how difficulties in uncovering 
information between different levels of authority can create significant government failures 
that can in turn have a huge impact upon the incentives faced by individuals, and on their 
accountability to those they’re employed to serve. 
 The principal-agent problem is particularly important in considering the relationship 
between government officials and their constituencies.40 Government earns its legitimacy 
through being of the people for the people,41 and as such in the basic model citizens of a 
country are considered the principal and government the agent. Ideally, government interests 
and those of the people should align. A principal-agent problem arises however, where the 
 
38 This was first theorized by Weber (1958). 
39 First developed in economics, for a review of the literature as applied to problems of 
politics see Miller (2005). 
40 The concept can be applied to many other levels also.  
41 As articulated by Rousseau in the classic social contract. 
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interests of an agent (government)42 and principal (people) are different. By manipulating the 
agent’s incentives, the principal wishes to leverage the agent to act in its interests and 
minimize shirking.43 While aggregate effects can often be observed ex post, there is an 
informational disadvantage to the principal (information asymmetry) that makes it difficult 
for them to know about the motivations, competence, and actions of agents. This information 
is necessary for choosing appropriate agents, and holding them accountable.44 We therefore 
have both a problem of hidden knowledge about agents, and a problem of hidden action (not 
knowing what they do). Because of information asymmetry there is an incentive created for 
the agent to take greater risks, and generally engage in practices not in the interests of the 
principal.45 These risks can be reduced if informational quality is improved, which further 
motivates the need to improve systems for MfDR. 
 Given the prohibitively large costs of comprehensive monitoring of individual actors’ 
behaviours, it is in the interests of the principal to create incentives to substitute for a 
coercive system of rules and supervision of the agent. Best is that the principal choose 
outcomes-based incentives to overcome in part the problems of moral hazard, despite 
operating at an information disadvantage to the agent. This transfers risk to the risk-averse 
agent. Second, moral hazard limits the benefits to the principal and the efficiency of the 
overall transaction because of the need to mitigate risk. An efficiency trade-off arises 
 
42 Or more specifically, the elites that make up its political and bureaucratic representatives. 
43 Also known as ‘agency costs’. 
44 Miller (2005), p204.  
45 This risk is known as ‘moral hazard.’  
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between efficiency in incentives and efficiency in risks.46 The best trade-off involves paying 
the risk-averse agent an outcomes-based bonus.47 While this may be the best option in theory, 
in government service there are limits to the ability to offer material bonuses. Non-material 
bonuses such as days-off work and intrinsic rewards may be substitutes for material bonuses.  
 The threat of ex post sanctions48 can also create powerful incentives for agents to do what 
it takes to ‘get results.’ In the case of car insurance for which the model was first theorized,49 
having the agent (the driver) pay a deductible in the case of an accident makes them more 
risk-averse than they might otherwise be. This in turn reduces the risk bourn by the principal 
(insurer), who has no way of comprehensively monitoring the agent to know the 
competence50 and risk-aversion (equivalent to temperament, motivation) of the agent. This 
situation is second-best when compared with the case of full information where the principal 
knew a lot about the agent beforehand, however because of moral hazard51 incentives can be 
only a partial correction for the problem of information asymmetry.52 Appropriate incentives 
 
46 Miller (2005), p205. 
47 Shavell (1979). 
48 As studied in Weingast & Moran (1983) and Weingast (1984), in connection with U.S. 
Congressional oversight of bureaucratic behaviour.  
49 Spence & Zeckhauser (1971). 
50 Competence can be considered a related issue of ‘adverse selection’.  
51 I.e. The person’s tendency to be more risky than usual when not observed. 
52  For the problem to be fully overcome, at some point individuals need to decide for 
themselves to internalise normative values of honesty and integrity in action. These norms 
and values may be influencable over time. In societies with significant physical, economic, 
and psychological insecurity, we cannot expect such values to become dominant in isolation 
from material concerns. This is fully consistent with psychological models such as Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs theorem.  
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can however, reduce moral hazard and can partially overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry. This model is directly applicable to the case of voters electing politicians, as 
outlined in a Part II A.  
 The threat of sanctions may also arise from implicit bargains such as policy promises (of 
politicians) or workplace contracts (in the case of bureaucrats). Without monitoring, 
principals can shape agents behaviour by offering implicit contracts based on the observable 
effects of that behaviour.53 Theoretically at least, this allows for the possibility of bargaining 
between principles and agents. 54  This creates a need for definable and somehow 
observable/measurable attribution between individual actions and results, though places a 
burden on monitoring that may be prohibitive. Where attribution of individual action to 
results is difficult, and the likelihood of shirking high, process-oriented criteria can be useful.  
In this approach, where there are specific tasks that need doing to ensure quality in 
implementation, the burden of proof for completion can be placed with the agent, such as 
requiring consultation with specific beneficiary stakeholder groups (up to a certain level of 
quality), providing complete financial records for disbursements, and so on. These kinds of 
mechanisms may be especially useful for public service positions. These kinds of incentive 
mechanisms place a particular emphasis on quality information.  
 Combining the broad political institutions with the more narrowly focused principal-agent 
literature depicts governance as a multi-layered interaction between voters, politicians, and 
 
53 For politicians elections theoretically perform this function. 
54  For example the case of election policy promises, in the case of politicians and the 
electorate; and individual workplace agreements, in the case of bureaucracy. 
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bureaucrats.55 Good governance requires effective accountability; effective accountability 
depends upon access to information in a world characterized by pervasive information 
asymmetries. Demonstrating how information leads to better outcomes through better 
informed policy, in the next section we consider the motivations of different actors that may 
also influence the incentives of government. 
55 The inclusion of bureaucrats into a multi-layered agency problem is explored further in 
Alesina & Tabellini (2004). 
PART  II: Incentivising Managing for Development Results 
Improving Managing for Development Results, in both the broad and narrow sense, is a 
matter of will and ability. While in some cases the maxim holds: ‘where there’s a [strong 
enough] will, there’s a way’, without will even great ability will not improve results. The 
positive political economy models highlight the central dilemma: how does one encourage 
people to adopt and use an information-revealing system when they have strong incentives to 
control and limit public access? This section considers the influence that external actors 
might have to increase politicians and civil servants’ will and ability to improve development 
results through implementing improved MfDR systems. Particularly, we shall consider 
actors’ influences on: (A) expanding the group of societal interests that have a stake in 
demanding high quality information, while weakening those with narrow interests; and (B) 
strengthening the use of information to overcome the hidden action problem (accountability), 
while weakening incentives to hide action. 
 
A. Expanding Societal Interests – The Importance of Inclusiveness 
The ability of external actors to influence the institutional structures of government is 
limited. At transition points following the cessation of conflict,56 following or during certain 
kinds of economic or other shocks,57 and at key points in the electoral cycle, key actors may 
 
56 World Bank (2006). Fragile States. 
57 For example, the many cases where high and rising inflation has led to governments 
requesting IMF assistance which has in turn been implemented with strict conditionality. 
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have influence in shaping institutions. The building of trust relationships over time58 and the 
demonstrable success and transferability of specific policies, practices and arrangements may 
contribute to an increased willingness of government leaders to engage in reform. Reform of 
an existing structure is difficult, since once ‘the rules of the game’ are known, rational actors 
will seek to further their own interests by forming strategies that may in turn entrench 
interested parties’ patterns of behaviour, creating losers and especially winners who may be 
able to consolidate power over time. Given uncertainty, those who benefit from current 
systems are unlikely to be enthusiastic for structural change, and uncertainty creating the 
possible threat of loss will be avoided. Even those who are at a low equilibrium level of 
welfare may be unwilling to deliberately engage in change if they are already vulnerable and 
change is perceived to further endanger them. For these reasons, for the most part we can 
expect politicians to respond to local demands, according to local norms, and as based upon 
existing institutions. 
 International actors may encourage beneficial effects but may also have inhibitive or even 
negative impacts on ‘encompassing-ness’ and information asymmetry. In general, external 
entities are more likely to promote encompassing-ness if international actors’ perceived 
interests and motivations align with the general welfare of the people of the poor country 
(creating will), and if the processes that are in place increase systems’ and individual 
capacities (ability). Some ways that international actors can have influence on encompassing-
ness are through promoting demand for information that leads to greater accountability, 
through helping to provide funds and technical expertise to set up MfDR systems, and 
through fostering good relationships with development partners. Businesses can have 
 
58 Pomerantz (2004). 
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positive influence through good practices, but also be potential sources of corruption. 
International organizations and bilateral donors can help to strengthen the demand for 
information by establishing and strengthening civil society groups and the media, and the 
private sector. If a country is very poor and the private sector weak, the positive role of 
private business and civil society organizations may be quite weak. This may be the case in 
most of the poorest countries that we are most concerned about. 
 International companies can also be potential sources of good practices, and can increase 
the encompassing-ness of government interests. If foreign firms invest, these international 
entities can encourage improved professional standards amongst those it deals with and 
employs in-country. International companies will also tend to import wholly their corporate 
governance systems. The possibility of improving both local and international business 
opportunities can provide strong incentives for governments to strengthen institutions and 
policies. The will to provide a facilitative environment for business can lead to substantive 
changes in government approaches, a focus on infrastructure, and transparency and 
accountability of government decision making - since these impact directly on country risk-
ratings and contribute to firm decisions on whether to invest in countries.59 Businesses rely 
on effective institutions to ensure property rights and facilitate business opportunities, such 
that a strengthening private sector will have a greater demand for predictability and 
transparency in government policy making especially, including long-term coherence in 
policy decisions, that can help facilitate business planning.  
 Improved information and more rational, transparent, predictable decision making is one 
criteria upon which business confidence is built, and generally more trust within society for 
 
59 Rondinelli & Cheema (2005). 
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government decisions. A long-term focus on the private sector can increase ‘the size of the 
pie’ for everyone. Strengthening the private sector will also in time allow those individuals 
who are predominantly ‘rent-seeker types’ to channel their ambitions there, perhaps in 
preference to seeking bureaucratic or political positions that may be valued and scrutinized 
upon different criteria.  
 Foreign-sponsored bribery is considered by many observers in developing countries to be 
the most significant factor to corruption60, which is characteristic of a narrowing of interests. 
International bribery can provide a strong disincentive against accurate and high-quality 
accounting and financial reporting, and also distort policy decisions at the political level. 
Various forms of corrupt practices may be encouraged or condoned by bilaterals or 
companies. The self-interest of bilaterals may be interpreted in narrow terms and not be 
consistent with the broad social interests of the people of recipient countries.61 The greater 
that this is the case, the more likely it is that information will be (mis)used to support narrow 
interests, and encourage both corruptors and corruptees to hide information about both their 
actions and knowledge. A government that seeks stable influence in a particular country may 
be much more likely to want to deal with a corruptible ruling elite than a potentially 
changeable democratic government. Business and trade opportunities with that bilateral may 
be opened-up that provides opportunities for some segments of the society, and this can have 
positive overall benefits. Depending upon specific bilateral interests however, foreign 
country representatives may decrease the encompassing-ness of a governments’ interest in its 
 
60 Andvig et al, p13.
61  Especially, for example, the USAID mandate to further its interests overseas. See 
particularly, Lancaster (2007). 
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own people’s general welfare, and encourage a culture of secrecy that works against using 
information for development results.  
 The influence of businesses on encompassing-ness and information asymmetry may 
depend on the kinds of business. Extractive industries, for example, may represent a narrow 
set of interests 62  with large incentives to conceal information about what it pays, little 
bottom-up pressure from consumers, 63 and likely from shareholders, and high potential gains 
from offering bribes to gain licensing concessions. Licensing fees may result in large 
opportunities for grand corruption. We cannot expect that the presence of large capturable 
mineral deposits such as oil will encourage either increased encompassing-ness or more open 
information, especially when there are strong narrow interests at both the supply side 
(recipient government officials) and the demand side (eg. international oil company), though 
the extractive industries’ Publish What You Pay initiative is one positive move in that 
direction. Recently instituted international anti-corruption conventions64 may have an impact 
on the ‘supply-side’ of corruption, however enforcement is very difficult. A related issue is 
that without a strong budgetary allocation system which can redirect government revenues 
back down to the lowest levels of the economy, strong government accountability and/or 
strong intrinsic motivations of leaders and officials, the likelihood of benefits going to the 
community are decreased. This is shown in the experience of many African countries is of 
what has become know as ‘resource curse,’ whereby despite large mineral or oil reserves, 
 
62 I.e. not ‘encompassing.’  
63 Since commodities are not brand differentiated, and even oil and gas brand recognition is 
limited, compared with consumer goods. 
64 Especially the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 2003, and the OECD anti-
bribery Convention 2005. 
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conflict and poverty have resulted. 65 Recent empirical studies have noted that large foreign 
aid recipients also exhibit political dynamics characteristic of resource-abundant societies, 
and probably for similar reasons; among them that large potential rents exist in a 
concentrated place.66 
A multiple principal agent problem arises when donors make recipient governments 
accountable to them, rather than to their own citizens. By substituting themselves for the 
people as the principal, international donors exacerbate principal-agent problems. If 
government officials become primarily accountable to international agency representatives, 
donors become government official clients (donors become the principals). This is a conflict 
of interest for the government. So long as international donor representatives are arbiters of 
country performance, there will always be a conflict of interest to the extent that performance 
criteria may reflect the interests of donors and not those of recipient countries’ people. This 
problem is exacerbated by the existence of multiple donors, each of whom have their own 
constituents at home.67 The non-alignment of donor is an inhibitor to recipient countries’ 
managing for results (in the general sense) in part because it reduces government focus on its 
legitimate real principal client (its own people) and thereby reduces encompassing-ness of its 
interest in them as being the source of governments’ legitimacy and authority.  
 Also, if projects in especially core program areas are implemented in parallel to regular 
government functions, government decision-making processes may not internalise the 
 
65 See for example, Shankleman (2006). 
66 See for example, World Bank (2006).  
67  Acknowledging the strain that multiple donors places on recipient governments has 
motivated an increased focus on donor harmonization, as outline in the Paris 2005 
Declaration.  
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importance of these functions and develop proficiency in them, possibly effectively reducing 
the everyday importance placed by regular government functionaries to those areas. 
Ironically, the greater the emphasis placed by international organizations on specific program 
areas- to the point where programs are implemented in parallel to government- the weaker 
may be core government focus on these areas. Unless capacity is developed and projects 
staged to gradually integrate donor-funded programs and projects into mainstream 
government functions, the long-term effect of aid programs may be to decrease 
encompassing-ness and exacerbate the principal-agent problems between donor and recipient 
government and their people.68 
These problems may be partially overcome if donors more actively considered poor 
citizens’ voice and direct results by basing decisions on proxies or direct data for these. By 
using quantitative and qualitative data from ground-level beneficiaries and basing decisions 
on those, international donors would make recipient governments accountable to the results 
delivered to their own people rather than the largely process-based accountabilities to 
donors.69 This approach would refocus attention to the role of citizens as principal,70 and to 
some extent addresses the information asymmetry created by donors. However, these kinds of 
proxies cannot be a long-term substitute for bottom-up accountability that is driven by local 
 
68 Though generally considered a capacity issue, parallel implementation arrangements have 
recently been  generally acknowledged to reduce long-term capacity-building and as such, 
the need to reduce reliance on them for project implementation is addressed specifically in 
the Paris Declaration (2005).  
69 Including, for example, beneficiary surveys that actually ask beneficiaries about the quality 
of services that they do and do not receive. 
70 For such an approach to be effective, organizational limitations need to be acknowledged, 
and the nature of the compromise understood. For example, as a bank, the World Bank has a 
necessary and legitimate responsibility to ensure the fiduciary feasibility of its loans, which 
implies certain limitations to what it can and cannot agree to. 
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demand. Inclusiveness must ultimately be home grown. This demand for accountability 
through information can come from civil society groups such as local think-tanks, university 
teachers, and especially media groups. International organizations can strengthen demand for 
accountability through helping to strengthen those groups and especially those that specialize 
in the gathering and disseminating information specific to the provision of public services. 
Other international actors including such organizations as Amnesty International, 
Transparency International, and many other internationally-oriented think-tanks, universities, 
and policy institutes can all provide positive support for increasing in-country focus on 
information to increase the policy-making competence and accountability of government 
actors.  
 
B. Overcoming Hidden Action Problems – The Importance of Transparency  
In low-information societies the problems of hidden action and hidden knowledge are not 
easily resolved. While the information asymmetry between government and the public is 
general too significant to be overcome only through better monitoring, this is especially the 
case in poor countries where the costs of information systems may be very high relative to 
other priorities. To reduce problems it is again important to strengthen the ability and will of 
agents to internalise the costs of information asymmetry. In general, there need to be systems 
in place, appropriate individuals selected, and incentives for their action. Particular incentives 
for both politician and bureaucrat are that there needs to be the possibility of consequence for 
failing in the responsibility of public office, and reward for results.  
33
It is through greater accountability that politicians are more likely to be responsive to 
voter wishes.71 For the politician, the main sanction for poor performance is the threat of not 
being re-elected.72 The threat of being exposed and not being re-elected can thereby be a 
disincentive from rent extraction. 73  A useful distinction can be made between formal 
accountability, where a formal mechanism exists whereby action can be taken against a 
politician, and real accountability, which requires that those who hold politicians to account 
have sufficient information to make the system work. Whereas elections serve the twin roles 
of selecting candidates and establishing formal accountability, the lack of quality information 
about government activities and performance inhibits the operation of real accountability. 
The ability of citizens to hold political and bureaucratic actors accountable requires both 
formal/informal institutions and information about government behaviour. 
 Selecting good politicians is important because individuals may differ in policy-making 
and implementation competence (ability), and because individuals’ motivations (will) may be 
different, including such concerns as integrity, honesty, altruism, and policy interests, and 
therefore be more or less willing to be responsive to citizen needs and wants.74 Given the 
difficulty of knowing a person’s inner motivations, information about past actions may be the 
best way of making informed decisions about candidates. This is another way of saying that 
one way to partially overcome the hidden knowledge problem is to focus on the hidden 
action problem. This can only be done through the gathering and dissemination of 
 
71 Besley (2006), p101. 
72 If the political system of the particular country allows for this. 
73 This approach was pioneered by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). 
74 Op cit. Besley (2006), p38.  
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information about individuals’ actions over time to a wide audience. These observations are 
consistent with empirical findings in the corruption literature that note that corruption is 
found to decrease with a free press75 and the number of newspapers per person.76 The issue 
of integrity of electoral systems (institutions) and transparency of information about 
candidates are therefore very important, and make issues of electoral corruption particularly 
important in selection issues.77 
Bureaucratic accountability operates differently than political accountability, in that 
bureaucrats can be given more explicit incentives for project delivery and are more 
specifically focussed on a narrow set of tasks, may be more sensitive to market based 
incentives (though there are constraints in offering these), and may have different 
motivations than politicians. In this case, politicians are the principal and bureaucrats the 
agent, while the beneficiaries (and the legitimate indirect principals) are the citizens.78 
But what can one do from the outside to ensure that once in the civil service officers do not 
fall prey to the opportunities they have? In the case of the bureaucrat, the agent can 
internalise the costs of information asymmetry in part through the principal (the politician, or 
bureaucratic supervisor) monitoring and rewarding performance, and through seeking to 
influence the bureaucrat’s motivations on the job, influencing their ability and will. Whereas 
 
75 Especially that not owned by the state. As based on Freedom House data, Brunetti & 
Weder (2003), Lederman, Loayza, and Reis Soares (2001), Sung (2002), cited in Lambsdorff 
(2005), p19. 
76 As a proxy indicator for the degree to which general population is informed, suggesting 
that a successful media may make it difficult for elites to perpetuate corrupt behaviour. 
Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2000), cited in Lambsdorff (2005). 
77 See, for example, Walecki, Martin. (2002). “Political Money and Corruption.” In 
Transparency International. Global Corruption Report. p20.
78 There arise also, therefore, a principal-agent problem at the bureaucratic level. 
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in the private sector there are ‘hard bottom-lines’ and tend to be clear sales and other targets, 
making agents accountable for performance through evaluation is more difficult in the public 
sector. This is because officials often have more information than the monitorers, there are 
likely to be more criteria for satisfactory than are found in the private sector, including equity 
of distribution and considering all stakeholders,79 there is a smaller set of possible material 
rewards,80 and possible limitations on sanctions because of job-security issues,81 as well as 
possible political protection.82 
As for the politicians, the main sanction for not adhering to civil service standards83 or 
some criteria of performance is the loss of one’s job. However, if information and incentive 
structures are such that civil servants are too internally focussed on the institutional 
environment and how their decisions may affect them and their career, this could have an 
adverse affect on/impede managing for good results. If an employee is insecure, they will not 
focus on the beneficiary so much as feel the need to protect themselves. Especially in a 
country with a high rate of unemployment, people with jobs may be fearful of losing them. If 
incentives are such that people fear systems change as a result of managing by results, then 
this may cause a disincentive for those with civil service jobs to want to MfDR. If an actors’ 
wages are dependent upon a system that threatens to punish them for certain kinds of 
information, they will be reluctant to reveal that information. We can expect incentives will 
 
79 Where performance is usually somehow linked to profit, plus perhaps customer 
satisfaction. 
80 Since the financial leeway is not there to pay big bonuses. 
81 Including possibly civil service regulations. 
82 Op cit. Besley (2006).  
83 In particular, breaking the law. 
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strengthen in line with the extent to which the information will be used to increase or 
decrease their rewards or to punish them, whether those are material or intrinsic 
rewards/punishments. In the poor-country civil service environment, if there is a real threat 
of being punished by losing one’s job for corruption, this may be a disincentive to behaviour 
that is not in the principal’s interests. 
 For a results-based culture to strengthen, there should be a strong focus on rewarding 
results in a way that acknowledges a person’s overall contribution, to processes as well as 
measurable and attributable end goals. For civil servants there needs to be a balance between 
results goals and process goals. Attribution is important. A person should only be judged on 
things that they have control over. Therefore, to judge a person according to only ‘results’ 
may be unfair. Accurate, timely measurement of results is difficult compared to assessing 
process measures. These rewards should be predominantly non-material rewards,84 to help 
strengthen a sense of the intrinsic worth of the work, while noting the absolutely necessity of 
being paid good wages,85 without which there is little hope of bureaucrats’ not supplementing 
their wages through accepting bribes or taking from the common pool. Having an agent be 
responsible to provide evidence of process compliance may be a way to ensure that some 
‘work’ is done, and also perhaps that resources are accounted-for, but we need to be careful 
that these processes are well linked to achieving actual results. Are the measures intended as 
 
84 Specific rewards for good work that are not strictly material include such things as: (i) 
recognition in the form of professional awards; (ii) increased responsibilities with 
performance (‘career’); (iii) training opportunities; (iv) participation in conferences, 
regionally and internationally; (v) seeing results on the ground; and (vi) being shown 
aggregated information and comparative information is an easily-understood form (from 
those in positions higher up the information chain), among others. There are, therefore, a 
range on incentives that can help civil servants focus on results through being rewarded for 
performance. 
85 Lambsdorff (2005). 
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accountability measures, to prevent bad behaviour,86 or to achieving the positive result? If we 
reward ‘good’ behaviour, people learn to show good behaviour to get rewards. If we punish 
‘bad’ behaviour, people do not necessarily learn to not do those things but may simply learn 
to hide them better! The latter case will also worsen the asymmetric information problem. 
The choice of measures is extremely important, since ‘what is measured gets done.’ That is, 
people do what they are rewarded and held accountable for. Depending upon just what is 
measured, “accountability can crowd-out learning”,87 possibly leading to less good results in 
the long term.  
 Bureaucratic selection may be as important an issue as in politics. This is a clear instance 
of the hidden knowledge problem—how to screen for unqualified applicants intent on using 
public office for private gain? The issue of selection in bureaucratic service is in trying to 
develop a civil service whose motivations are less towards extrinsic material rewards than 
intrinsic. This problem may be partially solved for competence (ability) by encouraging a 
competitive selection process wherein applicants’ experiences are considered alongside 
testing, and selection into the civil service based on their performance on such tests.88 
However, a person’s motivations may be highly contingent upon circumstance, and there is 
no easy test for such things. A person’s previous record and the recommendations of other 
people are one source. In a world in which the inner workings of a person’s mind is difficult 
 
86 I.e. Creating a negative incentive to bad behaviour. 
87 Cooley (2007). Available at: http://www.mfdr.org/RT3/Glance/Day2/index.html
88 A related empirical study finds that merit-based recruitment, as based on proportion of 
University graduates hired, is correlated with a decrease in corruption. Based on a survey of 
35 developing countries. Evans & Rauch (2001). 
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to know, the hidden knowledge problem can be partially overcome through knowing the 
results of a person’s past actions.  
 While MfDR reforms may increase aggregate social welfare over time, we might expect a 
corrupt person to thwart attempts to improve accountability structures if they are able, to 
protect their rents. However, the incentives to MfDR are asymmetric with the disincentives 
away from corruption. That is, while encouraging managing for results will not of itself 
decrease the incentives towards corruption, though it will decrease opportunities (ability) 
over time. Also, measures to strengthen information gathering, flows, and use, and thereby 
transparency and accountability, may have general as well as specific effects that may be 
difficult to thwart. However, while MfDR can improve information transparency and give 
more actors a greater stake in general welfare results, specific institutions to sanction and 
enforce anti-corruption will be necessary, decreasing the ability of actors to engage in 
socially destructive action without negative consequence to themselves, thereby decreasing 
incentives to do so. Where there are simultaneously strong positive and negative incentives to 
engage in corruption,89 the effect of positive civil service rewards may be weakened, since 
they compete with the gains from corruption. In a sense, the only long-term resolution to 
corruption and governance issues seems to be improving the opportunities of the private 
sector relative to the rents available in the public sector, strengthening sanctions in line with 
what is possible and sensible, thereby reducing incentives to hide information that can in turn 
be used to improve development results.  
 
89  That is, both significant rewards in taking bribes or otherwise engaging in corrupt 
practices, while also being significant personal negative consequences to oneself or family if 
one refuses to do so. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to outline the role of information in government effectiveness, 
describing some of the ways that government actors may be influenced to want to implement 
MfDR tools and approaches. The main incentive for governments is in their recognising the 
long-term value for improving social welfare outcomes, operating through improved decision 
making, and the partial overcoming of asymmetric information problems including hidden 
knowledge and hidden action. The main factor in governments’ being able to improve 
information systems is in their allocating and/or receiving specific resources to meet the 
short-term costs of building systems and individual capacity-building. As a specific and 
costly public good, information will tend to be under-valued and underprovided.   
 We can expect that a government will be more enthusiastic to provide public goods to its 
citizens, the greater is the encompassing interest in the general welfare. Even if a narrow elite 
governs a country it will be still be in the interests of that elite to provide public goods, 
including to strengthen results-based management, to the extent that taxation and other 
benefits are accrued by that elite as a result of the general welfare effects of providing those 
public goods. Governments are also more likely to recognise the value of MfDR systems if 
they have been proven in other places under varying conditions. The agency model identifies 
information as an important part of providing effective incentives for government actors 
especially through encouraging accountability. These interests can be expanded through 
greater participation in government by a wider cross-section of society, and through the 
strengthening of media, concerned civil society groups, and broad business interests within 
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the country. Over time, improved information is likely to increase the encompassing interest 
of government elites in a generalised social welfare, especially if information is extended to a 
wide range of interested constituents.  
 While the ability of external actors to influence the incentives of politicians and 
bureaucrats to want to MfDR may be limited, those influences can range between the 
strongly positive to the strongly negative. International organizations can have a strongly 
positive effect in providing resources and expertise to facilitate the building of institutional 
capacities and information systems that can help address information asymmetry problems 
(supply side), while encouraging the development of local demand through funding the 
strengthening of broad-based civil society groups and encouraging private sector 
development (local demand side). International actors can also severely inhibit the gains of 
technical and financial assistance because of problems caused by being made responsible to 
donors as the principal (rather than the beneficiaries) and through parallel implementation 
processes, which may impact on both the will and ability of government actors to focus on 
MfDR. As the legitimate beneficiary is the people of the recipient-country, these people 
should also therefore be considered the client and the ultimate arbiter of success, and 
measures of success should therefore focus on citizens’ voice and results on-the-ground. The 
most invasive aspect of international influence is (the supply of) corruption, which 
undermines the basis for government for the people, encouraging instead narrow interests 
that undermine development goals. This situation can be addressed in part through local and 
international focus on building institutional capacities – including improved information – 
for detecting and prosecuting of corrupt acts.  
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The problem of using information to improve development results is ultimately one of will 
and ability. The selection and retention of talented and leaders and civil servants is crucial to 
providing improved policy decisions over time that will enhance overall welfare. However, 
there is limited ability to overcome hidden knowledge problems about individuals’ 
motivations and intentions. It is therefore through strengthening institutions that promote 
accountability through the use of high quality information to overcome the hidden action 
problem that individuals are more likely to become disciplined to do the socially good. It is 
hoped that through creating better systems of information gathering, dissemination, and use, 
that abilities and incentives to govern for a broader set of constituents will improve, while 
opportunities and incentives to govern for narrow interests will weaken. The analysis leads us 
to a broad affirmation of the value of democratic inclusiveness and transparency in 
governance.  
 While understanding successful cases is important in being able to adapt them to different 
countries, we also very much need to understand inhibiting factors in implementing the 
systems that will influence results over time. To extend the theoretical work done in this 
paper, specific applied case studies could be very useful. Given pervasive conditions of 
poverty in Africa and other parts of the world, the current international focus on MfDR is an 
extremely important push that holds great promise to improve decision-making and address 
problems of transparency and accountability in governance. It is hoped that improving 
incentives to strengthen MfDR systems and capacities will lead to strongly improved results 
over time. It is therefore also an important area for further applied research. 
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